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EXAMINATION UNDER OATH OF CONFIDENTIAL WITNESS

DATE: September 18, 2025

TIME: Commenced at 10:33 a.m.
Concluded at 11:36 a.m.

Pages 1 through 31

Stenographically Reported By:

Teresa R. Cruise, CRR, RPR, FPR-C, FPR
Registered Professional Reporter
Florida Professional Reporter
Notary Public, State of Florida

1 APPEARANCES:

2 On Behalf of Tina Peters:

3 JOHN CASE, ESQUIRE OF:

4 Colorado Attorney
5 6901 South Pierce Street
6 Suite 340
7 Littleton, CO 80128
8 (303) 667-7407
9 Brief@johncaselaw.com

10 Also Present:

11 Caleb Bowen, Videographer

12 Also Remotely Present:

13 Jose Vega, Interpreter
14 Linda Good
15 Jason Ickes
16 Walter Daugherty

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Examination Under Oath of CONFIDENTIAL WITNESS

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NO.	DESCRIPTION	PAGE
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(NO EXHIBITS MARKED)

1 The examination under oath of CONFIDENTIAL WITNESS
2 was taken on Thursday, September 18, 2025,
3 commencing at 10:33 a.m.

4 Said examination under oath was reported by
5 Teresa R. Cruise, CRR, RPR, FPR-C, FPR
6 Notary Public, State of Florida at Large.

7 - - - - -

8 (The witness, having already presented
9 their government-issued identification and
10 their identity verified, was sworn in as
11 follows.)

12 THE STENOGRAPHER: Mr. Vega, could you
13 please raise your right hand?

14 Do you solemnly swear to truly and
15 accurately interpret from English to
16 Spanish and Spanish to English the
17 questions propounded and the answers given,
18 and that you have such the ability to do
19 so?

20 THE INTERPRETER: I swear and I swear
21 that I have done so to this point this
22 morning.

23 THEREUPON,

24 JOSE VEGA,
25 the interpreter, was sworn to truly and correctly

1 translate English into Spanish and Spanish into
2 English.

3 - - -

4 THE STENOGRAPHER: Mr. Vega, would you
5 please ask our deponent to raise his right
6 hand?

7 Do you swear or affirm the testimony
8 you're about to give will be the truth, the
9 whole truth, and nothing but the truth, so
10 help you God?

11 THE WITNESS: Yes, I do.

12 THE STENOGRAPHER: You can put your
13 hand down.

14 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Here begins the
15 examination under oath of a confidential
16 witness.

17 Today's date is September 18, 2025.

18 The time is 10:33 a.m.

19 Would counsel please introduce
20 themselves for the record?

21 MR. CASE: My name is John case. I'm
22 a lawyer representing Tina Peters.

23 I'm investigating whether foreign
24 agents manipulated computer voting systems
25 in U.S. elections.

1 THE VIDEOGRAPHER: You may proceed.

2 THEREUPON:

3 CONFIDENTIAL WITNESS,

4 having been first duly sworn, was examined and
5 testified as follows:

6 EXAMINATION

7 BY MR. CASE:

8 Q. Sir, do you have personal knowledge,
9 whether the election systems, in the United States,
10 the voting systems, can be manipulated by foreign
11 agents?

12 A. The electoral systems of the United
13 States can be manipulated by foreign agents or
14 third parties.

15 Q. Sir, are you in danger, physical
16 danger, if your true identity is known?

17 A. Yes.

18 Q. And in order to protect your safety,
19 have you and I agreed that your identity will be
20 redacted in the final transcript of your testimony,
21 and that your face will be disguised and your voice
22 will be altered by technology?

23 A. That's correct.

24 Q. Have you received any money or thing
25 of value in exchange for your testimony today?

1 **A.** No, not at all.

2 **Q.** Have you been promised any money or
3 thing of value in exchange for your testimony
4 today?

5 **A.** No, not at all.

6 **Q.** Can you tell us about your expertise
7 in voting system computers?

8 **A.** I have 20 years of experience in
9 electoral systems. This comes from Venezuela, from
10 2003 onward, where we received for the time and we
11 configured the Smartmatic systems for the first
12 time in Venezuela. We configured the transmission
13 systems and the tally systems.

14 I was the National Coordinator for
15 voting machines. I was the National Coordinator
16 for national data and I work in the creation of
17 situation rooms or war rooms for the Venezuelan --

18 THE STENOGRAPHER: Mr. Vega, your
19 audio cuts out at the end of your sentence.

20 (A discussion off the record was
21 held.)

22 BY MR. CASE:

23 **Q.** You were the National Coordinator for
24 data situation rooms or war rooms for the
25 Venezuelan government?

1 **A.** Yes. Yes, I was the person in charge
2 in the situation room, for the Venezuelan
3 government.

4 **Q.** Is the situation room called a war
5 room?

6 **A.** That is correct.

7 **Q.** Who is present in the war room during
8 an election?

9 **A.** The president of the republic, the
10 vice president, they could either be there in
11 person or via call. The main ministers for the
12 country are there, and the president of congress or
13 what is called the National Assembly.

14 In the specific case of Venezuela, it
15 would be Diosdado Cabello, Jorge Rodriguez, Delci
16 Rodriguez, Rafael Ramirez as the president of the
17 oil industry. High level military personnel.

18 Those are the ones that are in these
19 situation rooms or war room.

20 **Q.** And were you personally present in the
21 Venezuelan war room with the people you just named
22 during elections in Venezuela?

23 **A.** I work together with them from 2004 to
24 2016.

25 **Q.** And when was the last time that you

1 were in the war room in Venezuela during an
2 election? What year was that?

3 **A.** 2015.

4 **Q.** Briefly describe your expertise in
5 computer technology.

6 **A.** Well, my high school degree is IT
7 degree, that's how we call it in Venezuela.

8 Aside from that, I went to the
9 university to study telecommunications, even though
10 I didn't end up graduating on that, I studied
11 telecommunication, business creation and
12 journalism.

13 I am knowledgeable regarding
14 programming systems, operating systems, such as
15 Windows and Linux, and in telecommunications in
16 general to be able to transmit the votes.

17 **Q.** What were you responsible for doing in
18 Venezuelan elections between 2003 and 2016?

19 **A.** I was responsible for configuring the
20 voting equipment. I was responsible for
21 configuring the electoral manager system,
22 responsible for the transmission systems,
23 responsible for the electoral system audits, along
24 with the Carter center and the European Union.

25 On top of that, I was, after that,

1 responsible for the data centers, where we keep all
2 the information of the voter records, biometric
3 systems and the electoral systems before an
4 election day.

5 THE INTERPRETER: Sorry, Counselor,
6 this is the interpreter.

7 The interpreter was somewhat unclear
8 in the last answer of the witness, whether
9 he meant the election systems where we keep
10 the election systems that were used during
11 election days, prior election days or to be
12 used for future election days.

13 MR. CASE: Can you ask him that,
14 please?

15 THE WITNESS: I meant the general
16 system, the general system where you keep
17 the backups for prior elections and where
18 you would set up future elections.

19 So, in the case of Venezuela, the
20 center is centralized in one place. It's
21 very similar to what is done here in the
22 United States except for that each county
23 has its own system and they operate very
24 much independently.

25 In Latin America, our countries have

1 just a single voting system, and the United
2 States has over 3,000.

3 BY MR. CASE:

4 Q. Are you familiar with a ministry in
5 Venezuela called the National Electoral Council?

6 A. Yes, I was an employee of the National
7 Electoral Council.

8 Q. And was it as an employee of the
9 National Electoral Council that you set up the war
10 room to manage the elections in Venezuela?

11 A. That is correct.

12 Q. Did you also set up or direct others
13 under your supervision to set up situation rooms in
14 the states throughout Venezuela?

15 A. Correct. We would create manuals so
16 they can replicate the rooms, and then send over
17 the data to the main room.

18 Q. So each state in Venezuela had its own
19 situation room where election data would be
20 transmitted to the war room; is that correct?

21 A. That's correct. Each individual
22 monitors his state and then sends over the studies
23 to the main room.

24 That's why I have the minister for the
25 administration in each one of the different rooms

1 because each minister is responsible for a certain
2 number of states in the country.

3 Q. Were the results of elections
4 manipulated in Venezuela while you worked for the
5 National Electoral Council?

6 A. That is correct.

7 Q. And how were election results
8 manipulated?

9 A. In the case of 2004, one million fake
10 voters were inputted into the system, into the
11 record of voters, and then the electoral system was
12 used in order to designate who each citizen had
13 voted for.

14 THE INTERPRETER: Sorry, the
15 interpreter would like to make a
16 correction.

17 "And the electoral system was used to
18 determine who each citizen had voted for
19 that the government later on used to be
20 able to persecute those that were not
21 within its ranks."

22 THE WITNESS: In 2006, a tool was
23 used. The tool was called S-A-E-S data
24 utel.

25

1 BY MR. CASE:

2 Q. Can you explain how SAES works?

3 A. SAES data utel is a tool that allows
4 you to do a general test of the entire electoral
5 system.

6 In order for you to test the entire
7 system, you need to input the credentials or the
8 certifications for the particularly election. And
9 this tool allows you to emulate voting machines in
10 order to then transmit the votes.

11 Q. Was SAES used in Venezuela to
12 manipulate the outcome of elections? So change the
13 results?

14 A. It was used by the technology
15 directors. In this case, his name is Eduardo
16 Hernandez. Later on it was used by Delci's cousin,
17 his name is Louis Campos Cabello.

18 Q. And how did they use SAES to
19 manipulate Venezuelan elections?

20 A. By using a statistical system, knowing
21 the electors behavior, without exceeding a maximum
22 of 2 or 3 percent of vote manipulation, while at
23 the same time taking over a large number of voting
24 machines that you need in order to change the total
25 amount of votes that you need to modify.

1 So, specifically, in the year 2008,
2 the technology director for the National Electoral
3 Council was in charge of transmitting the data from
4 an entire state so that his relatives could win.

5 And this can be corroborated because
6 in the transmission system, the telephone companies
7 have to show that all the voting machines issue the
8 transmissions through the official channels, and a
9 red flag came up that -- that particular state,
10 that's the state of Merida, had not issued its
11 transmission yet. So it issued a red flag in order
12 for it to be determined whether there was a failure
13 or an error.

14 And so the national center of
15 tallying, or the adjudication center, responded
16 that -- that the entire state's data had already
17 been transmitted, yet there was no traceability, no
18 trace that showed that state had transmitted the
19 data through the regular transmission channels.

20 So, the solution was to have all the
21 different pieces of equipment retransmitted. But,
22 nevertheless, that would not change the final
23 tally, because the tally was already there -- the
24 total was already there, and all the technical
25 reports regarding these errors or failures were

1 handed over to the military personnel.

2 So they used SAES data utility tool to
3 transmit the entire information for the entire
4 state because you can use it to transmit correctly
5 all the state's data.

6 This is supposed to be a tool that --
7 for its normal usage, it's supposed to allow you to
8 test the integrity of the system. When it's
9 misused, it can allow you to inject votes without
10 people knowing you did so.

11 Q. And can you tell us what S-A-E-S
12 stands for?

13 A. System automated electoral systems --
14 is it system?

15 It's automated system of elections
16 or -- or something similar. It's like a
17 centralized electoral system. It stands for
18 automated system of elections or something like
19 that.

20 That is -- that is -- applies for the
21 entire line of products from the Smartmatic
22 company. Every product is called SAES. So, in
23 Venezuela, we had SAES 3000, 3300, SAES 4000.

24 And in the United States, they used
25 SAES 3367, for the Chicago, Illinois machine, where

1 President Obama, in the 2006 elections, cast his
2 vote.

3 Q. Is there a data utility feature for
4 S-A-E-S?

5 A. So there's a tool -- aside from the
6 system itself, there's a tool called SAES data UTEL
7 that allows you to test the entire system.

8 In general, any company providing
9 election systems needs to have such a tool because
10 they need to be able to prove the integrity of the
11 system.

12 Q. Can the S-A-E-S data utility tool be
13 used to manipulate election results?

14 A. That is correct.

15 Q. How does that work?

16 A. So, in the case of Venezuela, this
17 tool has been designed for the SAES system. So,
18 now, if my system is integrated with an external
19 system, I have to then adapt my tool to be able to
20 test all of the element of my system plus the
21 element of the other system that is being
22 integrated with my system.

23 Well, then, this happened in 2005 when
24 Smartmatic, of the Venezuelan government who owns
25 the source code, the source code belongs to the

1 government, made an integration with the American
2 company called Sequoia Voting Systems when it was
3 acquired in the year 2005 to then bring to pass the
4 elections -- carried out the elections in Chicago,
5 Illinois in 2006.

6 That then lending or selling its
7 technology to Dominion Voting Systems in the year
8 2010, meaning that I need to have a tool to test
9 the integrity of the system, and I adapt that tool
10 to the different integrations.

11 So that's why I'm saying that you
12 would adapt the tool to each one of the systems
13 because each system has a different way in which it
14 writes to the databases and different processes.

15 **Q.** Is auditing an election part of the
16 Smartmatic software?

17 **A.** That is correct. And it varies by
18 state and country. And, also, when you audit an
19 election or when you audit a system, you will be
20 auditing only that which the company wants you to
21 see or what the electoral body wants you to see.

22 In other words, it's not like the
23 audit is like an open audit, only the modules and
24 the functions that the public needs to know are
25 audited.

1 That is why you have been unable to
2 detect whether a library has been hidden, has been
3 locked or if it can be manipulated, and you are not
4 auditing tools like this one either, like SAES data
5 utility, which are tools that allow you to inject
6 votes.

7 So people ends up not knowing what the
8 tool's actual purpose or utility is.

9 Q. So if an audit discovers a problem,
10 was there a strategy of how to explain that to the
11 public?

12 A. No, because you would never show the
13 public the errors of the system, you would only
14 show the functionality of it.

15 It was only in 2004 that it was
16 uncovered, that you could find out who people voted
17 for; and, by 2005, there was a modification made,
18 but that was the only thing.

19 Q. What was -- what was the role of human
20 error in terms of public relations?

21 How did human error figure into the
22 public relations of Smartmatic?

23 A. When any company -- and that doesn't
24 just apply to Smartmatic -- when any company
25 mentions human error, what you're doing is you're

1 putting the responsibility for the blame on a
2 person, and not on the system itself.

3 It's easier for me to fire somebody
4 from a company and then pay them their severance
5 package as compared to me losing my entire business
6 because my electoral system, or the system that I
7 am selling has errors. I would end up losing
8 everything.

9 That's why you can read up how all
10 these different electoral companies, they're always
11 alleging human errors here and there. Therefore,
12 for any type of manipulations of elections, you
13 need to have the company to provide the certs
14 because they are the ones who know how their own
15 system works.

16 They know how to make an injection
17 into the system in an undetectable manner, so that
18 when a detailed audit of the election is performed
19 it wouldn't show any sort of trace.

20 **Q.** Is this S-A-E-S data utility similar
21 in its security to a key to a house?

22 **A.** That is correct.

23 **Q.** Can you explain?

24 **A.** This tool allows you to emulate a
25 voting machine.

1 information, based on the audits that the European
2 Union did of the elections of 2004, where its
3 president -- the president of Smartmatic, Antonio
4 Mugica, he informed the European Union that the
5 source code was property of the National Electoral
6 Council.

7 **Q.** What is the connection between
8 Dominion Voting Systems, Sequoia Voting Systems and
9 Smartmatic?

10 How are those three entities related?

11 **A.** So Smartmatic purchases Sequoia in
12 2005, so the SAES software is implemented for the
13 element of Sequoia.

14 From 2007 to 2013, Sequoia and
15 Dominion worked for the elections in the
16 Philippines. And that relationship allows Dominion
17 to purchase Sequoia in 2010, allowed it to purchase
18 Sequoia in 2010.

19 So, therefore, the SAES election
20 software from Smartmatic ended up being implemented
21 in Sequoia and later on transferred to Dominion.
22 And you have two engineers there, their names are
23 David Moreno and Ronald Morales, which are -- which
24 were the ones that handled the integration of the
25 software belonging to Smartmatic called SAES and

1 integrated it into Sequoia.

2 And then these very same engineers did
3 the integration from Sequoia to Dominion in the
4 year 2010. Currently, these engineers still work
5 for Dominion and they are in charge of their
6 software.

7 **Q.** Where is the worldwide global
8 headquarters for Dominion Voting Systems, Inc.?

9 **A.** They have three headquarters, United
10 States, Canada and Belgrade, Serbia.

11 It is in Serbia that they developed
12 the programs that are then implemented here in the
13 United States. Ronald Morales is the person in
14 charge of configuring the entire security network
15 so that these three different headquarters can
16 communicate between themselves.

17 At that point in time, they used
18 initially VPN networks. And, during the days that
19 the American elections were held, Serbia is the
20 office that is responsible for resolving the errors
21 that pop up in the systems.

22 **Q.** Is it possible for engineers in
23 Serbia, working for Dominion Voting Systems, to
24 inject votes into an election in the United States
25 of America?

1 **A.** Though I don't have evidence of that,
2 it is possible. If I happen to have access, remote
3 access to the system, I can make changes in the
4 electoral system.

5 **Q.** And would that be by using the S-A-E-S
6 data utility tool?

7 **A.** No.

8 **Q.** And then how would it be done?

9 **A.** Well, we need to understand something.
10 Let's not, you know, end up marrying this tool
11 name, but rather its functionality.

12 So what this tool does, SAES data
13 utility, it uses the libraries for the electoral
14 system that were first used in Venezuela then
15 transferred over to Sequoia and then finally to
16 Dominion.

17 It uses system votes or errors --
18 let's call it the libraries. The libraries for
19 data transmission, data encryption by libraries,
20 the communication between the databases.

21 So what SAES data utility does is that
22 it takes the credentials or passwords for an
23 election so that the system can authorize it to
24 connect itself, and then it can inject as many
25 votes as it needs to.

1 If the Dominion systems have bugs in
2 their libraries, then, in turn, you can you can use
3 those bugs while having the correct credentials or
4 passwords, and use the processes of the same system
5 to then inject the votes that are needed, whether
6 it be minutes, data or votes.

7 Whatever that the system allows me to
8 do, I will be able to do it while using those
9 libraries.

10 **Q.** Did you review the forensic image of
11 the Mesa County election management server from the
12 November 2020 election?

13 **A.** I did.

14 **Q.** And what did you find in your
15 examination of that forensic image?

16 **A.** That the electoral systems of Dominion
17 have vulnerabilities that can be used to attack the
18 system. It's source code is not a hundred percent
19 obfuscated, or hidden.

20 The use in handling passwords --
21 they're all stored in plain text, which allows you
22 to get that data from the database. You can get it
23 from the backups of the different elections, from
24 the settings files of an election, and from the
25 button device that allows to have access to the

1 equipment, because the credentials are also stored
2 in the button itself.

3 So, once you have that information,
4 and if you know how the system operates, then you
5 can attack the encryption levers, which then
6 literally allows you to manipulate the system and
7 change votes at will.

8 Additionally, on top of that, the
9 Windows Operating System has, in turn,
10 vulnerabilities and can also be attacked using an
11 error code, it's called the internal blue. It's an
12 attack system that even the entity the NSA uses
13 here in the United States.

14 Q. Now, after the 2020 election, we were
15 told by the Attorney General of the United States
16 that the 2020 election was the most secure in
17 history.

18 We were also told by the Colorado
19 Secretary of State that the Colorado voting system
20 was the gold standard for running elections.

21 Can you tell us if that is true? Are
22 our elections in the United States and Colorado
23 really secure?

24 A. No, they are not secure.

25 Q. Can any election be run fairly and

1 securely using Dominion software, which is so
2 susceptible to manipulation?

3 **A.** Well, we have to keep in mind or
4 understand something clearly: No system is
5 infallible.

6 Dominion's software is a software that
7 has a lot of errors or bugs. And they have --
8 they've had many years to correct them and they
9 haven't done so. From an IT standpoint, you could
10 even say that the types of errors that they have
11 made are very basic. But the reason why those
12 errors are intentionally there is because they need
13 it, they need them.

14 Now, can they be cured in the future?
15 Of course they can. Is it possible that you can
16 have a secure election using electronic voting
17 systems in the future of the United States? Of
18 course.

19 But the current voting -- the current
20 software that Dominion Voting Systems is using
21 right now does not provide the -- cannot ensure
22 that an election cannot be manipulated because if
23 we, not knowing how their system worked, were able
24 to detect the bugs, that means that either an
25 engineer or a technician working for Dominion that

1 have even better knowledge than we have, can use
2 his or her system to manipulate the votes as
3 needed.

4 And it can be done indetectably --
5 without be detected.

6 Q. Have you understood all of my
7 questions as translated by the interpreter?

8 A. That is correct.

9 Q. Did you answer all questions
10 truthfully?

11 A. Totally truthfully.

12 Q. Were your answers based on your
13 personal knowledge?

14 A. Totally.

15 Q. Okay. You have another appointment
16 and you have to interrupt this to go to that
17 appointment?

18 A. Yes, as I told you earlier when we
19 first started.

20 Q. Would you come back later this
21 afternoon, please?

22 A. Yes.

23 As soon as I'm done with my other
24 appointment, I can come back and we can continue
25 this conversation.

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THE VIDEOGRAPHER: Thee time is

11:35 a.m.

We are going off the video record.

(The examination under oath was
adjourned at 11:35 a.m.)

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CERTIFICATE OF OATH

THE STATE OF FLORIDA
COUNTY OF PASCO

I, Teresa R. Cruise, Notary Public, State
of Florida, certify that JOSE VEGA remotely
appeared before me on the 18th of September, 2025,
and was duly sworn.

Signed this 18th day of September, 2025.

TERESA R. CRUISE, CRR, RPR, FPR-C
Notary Public - State of Florida
Commission Number: HH351124
Expiration Date: 02/25/2027

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CERTIFICATE OF OATH

THE STATE OF FLORIDA
COUNTY OF PASCO

I, Teresa R. Cruise, Notary Public, State
of Florida, certify that CONFIDENTIAL WITNESS
personally appeared before me on the 18th of
September, 2025, and was duly sworn.

Signed this 18th day of September, 2025.

TERESA R. CRUISE, CRR, RPR, FPR-C
Notary Public - State of Florida
Commission Number: HH351124
Expiration Date: 02/25/2027

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C E R T I F I C A T E

THE STATE OF FLORIDA
COUNTY OF PASCO

I, Teresa R. Cruise, a Certified
Shorthand Reporter, do hereby certify:

That I was authorized to and did
stenographically report the foregoing examination
under oath of CONFIDENTIAL WITNESS, pages 1 through
31, that a review of the transcript was not
requested, and that the transcript is a true record
of my stenographic notes.

I further certify that I am not a
relative, employee, attorney, or counsel of any of
the parties, nor am I a relative or employee of any
of the parties' attorneys or counsel connected with
the action, nor am I financially interested in the
action.

The foregoing certification of this
transcript does not apply to any reproduction of
the same by any means unless under the direct
control and/or direction of the certifying
reporter.

DATED this 18th day of September, 2025.

TERESA R. CRUISE, CRR, RPR, FPR-C